


TOP SECRET

25X1



14 March 1960



25X1

Copy No. C 68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 12
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HQ TS-2

DATE: _____ REVIEWER: 

25X1



25X1

DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO
Lebanon-UAR: [President Shihab recently informed the American ambassador that the UAR is pressing strongly to install UAR-manned radars in Lebanon to provide warning of possible Israeli overflights. In order to forestall this, Shihab requested a grant of US radar equipment and a US training team.]

25X1

25X1

Iraq: Baghdad University is seeking Western assistance to fill 230 positions by 15 May for the next academic year as an alternative to Soviet bloc personnel, according to a note delivered to the American Embassy. [Some Iraqi educational officials are dissatisfied with bloc teachers now at Baghdad University.] This is the first formal request for large-scale American educational assistance since the 1958 revolution.

25X1

25X1

25X1

i

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

III. THE WEST



No
France-Algeria: [Socialist leader Guy Mollet considers De Gaulle's recent pessimistic statements in Algeria on a cease-fire a serious step backward and "a small, and as yet not serious, sign of bad faith" toward French leaders who have backed his search for a liberal Algerian solution. The Socialist party communiqué of 9 March, which criticizes the idea of a solution achieved solely by military victory, is the first public departure by the Socialists from their firm support of De Gaulle's Algerian policy in recent months. In view of the increasing breach between De Gaulle and rightist advocates of "French Algeria," this further restricts his maneuverability.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

OK
Argentina: ~~T~~ension is increasing as the congressional elections of 27 March approach. The Peronistas and Communists, reacting to President Frondizi's efforts to proscribe their candidates, are both campaigning for the casting of blank ballots by several parties as a sign of opposition. They hope that a plurality of blank votes would encourage efforts to unseat Frondizi, who is increasingly unpopular because of hardships under the US-backed stabilization program. While the government sees the blank vote as helping maintain its majority in congress, it continues firm security measures.

25X1


14 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

25X1



25X1

80514 00312

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

Lebanon Requests American Radar Installations

[President Shihab has requested that the United States provide Lebanon with radar equipment and a training mission in order to forestall UAR demands to locate UAR-manned radar in Lebanon's Biqa Valley.]

[During the past three years, Shihab has resisted UAR urgings from time to time that UAR troops be stationed in Lebanon as a defensive measure against Israel. For over a year the UAR has been pressing strongly for radar installations. Shihab feels that, since radar is defensive in character, installations manned by a US training team would not exacerbate relations with the UAR. The Lebanese chief of staff has strongly implied to the American air attaché that such an installation could, for all practicable purposes, be considered as an American radar outpost.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Baghdad University Seeking Western Academic Staff

In order to provide an alternative to Soviet bloc personnel, Baghdad University is seeking Western assistance to fill, by 15 May, 230 teaching positions for the next academic year, according to a note delivered to the American Embassy. The note, which was delivered to 14 diplomatic missions in Baghdad, including those of the bloc, listed positions in a wide range of academic fields, including science, medicine, engineering, government, law, economics, business administration, history, English literature, and foreign languages.

The Qasim regime is laying great emphasis on expanding education throughout Iraq, and the enrollment at Baghdad University has grown from 5,750 to 11,900 students, including 400 from other Moslem countries, since the July 1958 revolution. This rise has caused a severe shortage of teaching staff. This shortage provides an opportunity for the West to reassert its influence--which it lost after the revolution--within the Iraqi educational system. Immediately following the overthrow of the Hashimite regime, Iraq turned to the UAR for teachers, but called on the Soviet bloc for teachers when Iraqi-UAR relations soured. At least 32 Soviet bloc nationals--representing Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Communist China--now are on the staff of the university.

[In discussing the note, pro-Western Iraqi officials have stated that they hope the United States and Britain would present as many qualified candidates as possible in order to provide an alternative to Soviet bloc personnel. They also stated that in spite of unfavorable experience with bloc teachers, principally because of a language barrier which is complicated by their lack of knowledge of English, pressure to accept them continues in the pro-Communist-dominated Ministry of Education. The American Embassy emphasizes that this is an excellent opportunity to combat the flood of Soviet influence in Iraq.] [redacted] 25X1

25X1

[redacted]
25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

[REDACTED]
Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

Socialist Criticism of De Gaulle's Algerian Policy [REDACTED]

[Guy Mollet, secretary general of the French Socialist party (SFIO), stated [REDACTED] that he thought De Gaulle, in his statements made to French troops in Algeria earlier this month indicating pessimism as to prospects for a cease-fire, had taken a "serious step backward" in dealing with the Algerian problem. Mollet said he personally feels the statements represent "a small and as yet not serious sign of bad faith" toward himself and other French leaders who have continuously backed De Gaulle's search for a liberal Algerian solution.]

25X1

25X6

[The Socialist leader, at first professing not to understand the reason behind the statements, later described them as the result of De Gaulle's frustration at the Algerian rebels and their failure to accept French conditions for negotiators of a cease-fire. Mollet was presumably referring to De Gaulle's demand that the rebels send fighting leaders to negotiate a cease-fire rather than political leaders of the Provisional Algerian Government, the existence of which France does not admit.]

[The SFIO communiqué of 9 March, apparently reflecting Mollet's concern, calls for a "double negotiation" prior to any cease-fire: negotiation of a cease-fire "with those who fight" and also a negotiation of guarantees of self-determination which, "since this interests all those destined to take part in the vote, should be engaged with representatives of all categories of the Algerian population."]

[The American Embassy in Paris noted that the communiqué, which also rejected the possibility of achieving any Algerian solution solely by a military victory, was the first instance in recent months that the SFIO had departed publicly from firm support of De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The party last criticized his policy--for delay in formulating a liberal solution--prior to his offer of self-determination on 16 September. Public criticism by the Socialists at this time further restricts De Gaulle's maneuverability, since it reflects a potential lack of confidence on the part of a key left-wing element of his public political support on Algeria following his increasingly overt breach with rightists as a result of the recent Algiers insurrection.]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]
Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

25X1

Tension in Argentina Rises as Elections Approach

At the approach of elections in Argentina on 27 March, tension is again increasing, and there are rumors of possible action to oust President Frondizi. With only brief respites, such tension has plagued Frondizi since his inauguration on 1 May 1958, reflecting the difficulties of overcoming the country's long-standing and bitter political divisions and economic problems. A number of recent bombings--although in no particular pattern--has increased concern over rumors of larger sabotage and coup plans. The Peronistas and the Communists have frequently used such war-of-nerves tactics.

The forthcoming elections are for one half of the seats of the Chamber of Deputies and some local offices. The Peronistas and Communists are calling for the casting of blank votes; they hope the blank vote will exceed the vote for Frondizi's Intransigent Radical party and thereby encourage efforts to overthrow him. This strategy is intended to counter Frondizi's request that the provincial courts ban candidates of the Communist party and the Peronistas' Justicialista party.

Frondizi believes the blank vote will reduce competition for offices and help him retain a majority in congress. He has publicly acknowledged loss of popularity because of his austerity and stabilization program, which enjoys US backing and which Frondizi has reiterated he will continue to press. While not restraining campaigning by legal parties, Frondizi is continuing strict security measures as a precaution against serious incidents. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]
25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT**The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000120001-2

TOP SECRET